In addition, I am myself-quite consciously--deploying a reflectionist epistemology when I invoke "the archive" as the basis for querying Ellison's representation of the left. While I am fully aware of current debates over the recoverability-indeed, the knowability-of history, my principal category of critique is, unapologetically, the notion of typicality, as defined and used by the Marxist theorist Georg Lukics. And typicality clearly presupposes the notion that, however mediated its connections with textual representation may be, there exists a reality prior to textualization, in relation to which a text can be said to be a more or less "accurate" mimesis. My use of "the archive" doubtless can and will be queried for its own necessary procedures of selectivity-and hence possible distortion. Nonetheless, I propose that Ellison's novel-and, by extension, other texts posing comparable issues about typicality in representation-must be set alongside "the facts" if we are to assess its cognitive-and indeed its moral-value. These are weighty considerations; I can only hope that my awareness of the minefield through which I am treading will in part help me to make my way.
In its focus upon the rhetorical manipulations performed by Ellison's text, moreover, this essay undertakes a critique not just of Ellison but also of those readers-both scholars and teachers-who have helped to codify and naturalize Ellison's anticommunism. To be sure, Ellison's rhetorical strategy invites such complicity. As I shall demonstrate, his symbols are carefully chosen to accumulate successive meanings; as these meanings move from antiracist critique in the Southern section of the novel to anticommunist polemic in the Northern section, the reader who obeys the dictates of formalist criticism by teasing out the deft patterning of Ellison's text necessarily-and often without realizing it-reproduces Ellison's ideological paradigm. In much commentary on Invisible Man, however, such na'ifve formalism is routinely accompanied by an almost knee-jerk anticommunism which simply assumes that Ellison "got it right" about the Communist Party: rarely does one encounter a critical discussion that calls into question the validity of Ellison's portrayal of the left or the judgments that flow from this portrayal. My essay thus takes to task, as it were, not merely Ellison himself but also those teachers and scholars who have without interrogation reproduced his anticommunist premises.
Clearly what is at stake in this essay, then, is an attempt on my part to dedemonize the US left. As I shall indicate below, I do this not because-though a committed leftist myself-I think that the CP of the later 1930s and 1940s is or should be beyond criticism. Rather, I undertake this project because the social contradictions that generated Communist activity in the past are still very much with us; it behooves us all to give left ideas a fair-minded hearing, and not dismiss them a priori, as the continuing heritage of the Cold War-of which much Ellison criticism remains, unfortunately, a significant literary-critical component-would urge us to do. In particular, I am concerned that we begin to question the well-nigh universally accepted belief that Communists have used African Americans and have, moreover, never (or only very infrequently) been African American themselves. While in its current form this notion takes the form of post-Althusserian arguments for the "relative autonomy" of race and class, its debt to Cold War era myths of red manipulation is profound. If we are to get beyond the narrow limits of "alliance" politics, it is necessary to recuperate, and retell, some of the history that helped give rise to those politics in the first place.
In part the anticommunist rhetoric of Invisible Man can be traced to Ellison's deployment of a high modernist narrative structure that enables him to set up multiple parallels between apparently different characters and situations. Ellison himself was quite explicit about his strategy in the novel, noting that the symbols were worked out in advance of the narrative itself (Shadow andAct 176). He was also alert to the rhetoric of fiction, noting that "it is only by appealing to our sense of experience and playing upon our shared assumptions" that the novelist can "persuad 
